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Abstract
The pace of international skilled migration has accelerated dur-
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the brain drain issue. It provides stylized facts on the magnitude and
skill composition of migration and explores the main ﬁndings on brain
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11 Introduction
The pace of international migration from poor to rich countries has acceler-
ated during the last decades. In particular, recent data suggest that emigra-
tion of highly skilled people from developing countries continues unabated.
What will be the consequences for both the receiving and the sending coun-
tries? Developing nations have long worried about the economic impact of
losing their best and brightest people and the more traditional economic
literature has long maintained that this ”‘brain drain”’ is unambiguously
detrimental for those left behind. A new perspective emerged in the early
90’s, showing the possibility of a ”brain gain” in the ”brain drain”. Indeed,
positive eﬀects of skilled emigration on home countries have been exempli-
ﬁed, taking the form of either ”incentive” (ex-ante) eﬀects on investments
in education in the sending economy or ”feedback” (ex-post) eﬀects such
as remittances, return migration after additional knowledge and skills have
been acquired abroad, and the creation of business and scientiﬁc networks.
In particular, the importance of expatriate networks has been highlighted
in recent debate, given the successful examples of the Indian and Chinese
mature diasporas that have greatly contributed to growth of the information
technology sector (see, e.g., Saxeenian, 1999, 2001, 2002, or Pandey et al.,
2006). These examples show that diasporas can promote trade, foreign direct
investment, and knowledge circulation.1 Other studies show that migrants
can also transfer new norms, e.g. more democratic values, new fertility be-
havior etc. (e.g., Splimbergo, 2009, Beine et al., 2009). In sum, the new
literature shows more and more diaspora feedback eﬀects.
This work aims at providing an overview of the brain drain issue, laying
particular emphasis on the resulting diaspora eﬀects. It is organized as fol-
lows: section 2 provides stylized facts on the magnitude and skill composition
of skilled migration; section 3 provides a brief literature review on the brain
drain problem, section 4 focuses on the diaspora eﬀects and section 5 gives
some hints for further research.
1See also for the relantionship between trade and migration, Gould, 1994, Head and
Reis, 1998, Combes et al., 2003, Rauch and Trindade, 2002, Rauch and Casella, 2003, for
FDI, Kugler and Rapoport, 2007, Docquier and Lodigiani, 2009, Javorcik et al., 2006.)
22 Stylized facts
Until recently, despite many case studies, there has been no systematic em-
pirical assessment of the brain-drain magnitude. For years, national author-
ities have stressed the need for more systematic and harmonized databases
that include skill or education categories. The ﬁrst systematic attempt to
assess the extent and nature of skilled migration was made by Carrington
and Detriagiache (1998). They constructed estimates of emigration rates of
workers at three educational levels (primary, secondary and tertiary) for 61
developing countries in 1990. These estimates were based on three main data
sources: US Census data on the skill composition of immigration, OECD data
on immigration per country of origin, and Barro and Lee’s (2001) data on
educational attainment in the source countries. Their study, however, relies
on very strong assumptions and suﬀers from many shortcomings. First, they
transpose the educational structure of US immigrants onto the OECD data.
For example, migrants from Algeria to France are assumed to be distributed
across education categories in the same way as migrants from Algeria to
the United States. However, since US immigration policy diﬀers from that
of other countries in that it is highly selective, the resulting estimates ar-
guably cannot be considered reliable for countries with a low emigration rate
to the US. Second, they use OECD migration statistics, which report lim-
ited information on the origin of immigrants, for non-US countries. Indeed,
many OECD statistics only report the origin of migrants coming from 10 or
15 countries, thus leading to an underestimation of immigration for a large
number of countries for which data were aggregated into an ”other countries”
category; for example, migration from Africa is particularly mis-measured.
Third, the OECD classiﬁes European immigrants by citizenship. This is
another source of under-reporting bias, as the number of foreign-born peo-
ple is usually higher than the number of foreign citizens. Moreover, OECD
statistics do not give any information on immigrants’ age of entry, so a for-
eign individual who arrived in the host country at age 1 and then graduated
there from higher-education institutions is considered to be a highly-skilled
immigrant. Finally, the Carrington and Detriagiache dataset excludes all
South-South migration, which can be relevant in some cases, for instance, in
the case of migration to the Gulf States from Arab and Islamic countries or
3to South Africa from its neighboring countries. 2
In addition, Adams (2003) used the same method to provide estimates
for the year 2000 for 24 labor-exporting developing countries with the same
shortcomings.
Docquier and Marfouk (2006) extended this research to the years 1990
and 2000 and included almost all of the OECD countries (195 countries
in 2000 and 174 in 1990) by collecting Census, Register and Survey data
that report migrant educational levels and countries of birth for all OECD
countries. They provide a dataset on international migration by educational
attainment that improves the previous datasets in diﬀerent ways. Mainly,
they address both the under-reporting problem and the problem of trans-
posing the US immigration education structure to the rest of the OECD
countries. Moreover, they expand the sample.3 Nevertheless, they did not
take into account South-South migration, even though this has been shown
to be relevant in some cases.4 More recently, Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk
(2007) updated and extended the Docquier-Marfouk dataset. They computed
gender-disaggregated indicators of brain drain, and they provided emigration
stocks and rates by level of schooling and gender for 195 source countries in
both 1990 and 2000.5 Based on these new datasets, we have an overview of
the trends in international migration for at least South-North migration and
North-North migration, as the last dataset still does not take into account
South-South migration.
We will now consider the main characteristics of skilled emigration, as
they can be inferred from the use of previously-cited datasets.6 Starting
with an overview of the main observed trends, we then focus more closely on
the distribution of migrants by education, quality and sector.
2See for example Docquier and Marfouk, 2006, Docquier and Rapoport, 2007, for fur-
ther details
3See Docquier and Marfouk, 2006, for further details on the methodology
4Parsons, Skeldon, Walmsley and Winters (2007) provide four versions of an interna-
tional bilateral migration stock database for 208 countries and territories of origin and
destination for the year 2000 and they account for South-South migration. AS far as we
know, this is the only data set that accounts for South-South migration.
5Emigration rates are deﬁned as migrants divided by migrants plus residents.
6We refer both to the Docquier-Marfouk dataset, 2006, and its updated version, Doc-
quier, Lowell and Marfouk, 2007. We disregard trends related to data disaggregated by
gender, and we focus just on one year, the 2000. For data across time, it is possible to
refer to Defoort, 2008. She looks at emigration rates, considering the six main immigration
countries, during the period 1975-2000 (one observation every ﬁve years).
42.1 Overview of the trends in international migration
Considering Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk’s (2007) dataset, the total size of
the working-aged population born in one country and living in another one
in the OECD area was around 40 million in 1990 and 57 million in 2000.
With regard to skill composition, international migrants are more likely to
be highly skilled than other workers. At the world level in 2000, highly-
skilled immigrants represented around 35% of OECD immigrants, while only
11.1% of the world labor force had post-secondary education. Considering
more speciﬁcally the case of developing countries, Docquier, Lohest and Mar-
fouk (2007) ﬁnd that in 2000, developing countries accounted for 64.5% of
total immigrants and 61.6% of skilled immigrants in the OECD, which is
15 percentage points higher than in 1990. About three quarters of these
immigrants live in one of the most important host countries with regard to
selective immigration policies (Australia, Canada and United States). One
ﬁfth of them live in one of the 15 member-countries of the European Union
(EU15). Finally, the skilled emigration rate (on average 7.3% for developing
countries) is much higher than the total average emigration rate (on average
1.5% ). The highest rates of skilled emigration are observed in small and
poor countries.
Docquier et al. (2007) decompose the skilled emigration rate into two
components, namely, openness, as measured by the average emigration rate
of the working-age population, and schooling gap, as measured by the relative
education attainment of emigrants compared to natives. In doing so, they
show how country size and the level of development are the key determinants
to explain the intensity of the brain drain from a given country
Through a preliminary descriptive analysis, they ﬁnd that the average
emigration rate decreases with the country size. Therefore, small countries
tend to be the most aﬀected by the brain drain in relative terms. As it
can be noticed in table 1, the emigration rates of skilled workers in Guyana,
Jamaica, Grenada and Haiti are more than 80%. In absolute terms (that
is, in terms of the number of educated emigrants), the largest countries are
strongly aﬀected by the brain drain, but countries with large stocks of skilled
emigrants exhibit low rates of emigration. For example, from table 1, in 2000
the main exporters of brain among developing countries, are the Philippines
(1,111,075), India (1,034,373), Mexico (949,334) and China (783,369) and
their emigration rates are 13.5% , 4.3% , 15.5% and 3.8 % respectively.
On the other hand, according to Docquier et al. (2007), another deter-
5minant of the skilled emigration rate is the schooling gap, measured by the
relative education attainment of emigrants compared with natives, which ob-
viously decreases in national income. This explains, caeteris paribus, why
poor countries suﬀer from brain drain. Schooling gap, moreover, depends on
destination. On average, the schooling gap observed in selective immigration
countries (Australia, Canada and the United States) is about twice as large
as the gap observed in EU15 and the rest of the OECD, where immigration
policies focus mainly on family reuniﬁcation and asylum seeking. The size of
the brain drain is therefore aﬀected by the positive selection of migrants.
But where do skilled migrants emigrate? If we consider the six major des-
tination countries, 51.41 % of skilled migrants emigrate to the United States,
13.45 % to Canada, 8.10 % to Australia, 6.09 % to the United Kingdom,
5.04% to Germany and 3.01 % to France.7
Considering the ﬁrst six countries with the highest number of skilled
immigrants and their 30 OECD destination countries, table 2 reveals that
both for developed and for developing countries, the largest diasporas can be
found in the US, followed by Canada (except for the United Kingdom, whose
second destination in absolute term is Australia). For India, the United
Kingdom is an important destination too. Obviously, location choices depend
on several factors, including historical ties, past colonial links, geographic
distance (e.g., the US is the main destination choice for migrants from Mexico
and Cuba), cultural and linguistic distances (e.g., for US migrants, the main
destinations are Canada and the UK). Past migration ﬂows seem to be an
important determinant as well, since they help to reduce migration costs
(Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2008).
2.2 Importance of the schooling location: educated at
home or abroad?
The Docquier and Marfouk dataset and its extended version consider as
skilled immigrants all foreign-born workers with university or post-secondary
training who are currently living in an OECD country. As Beine, Docquier
and Rapoport (2007) underline, ”this deﬁnition is based on the country of
birth and does not account for whether education has been acquired in the
home or in the host country. Depending on the objective for which the data
7On the total stock of skilled migrants in 2000 in the OECD area, stock that amounts
to 20,250,041, according to Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009) dataset
6Table 1: Overviews of the trends in international migration (year 2000)
All countries Highest All countries Highest
emigration emigration
stock rates
United Kingdom 1478477 Guyana 89.24%
Philippines 1111075 Jamaica 84.58%
India 1034373 St Vincent & Gren. 84.58%
Mexico 949334 Grenada 84.25%
Germany 936523 Haiti 83.36%
China 783369 Cape Verde 82.42%
Korea 612939 Palau 80.88%
Canada 523463 Trinidad and Tobago 78.95%
Vietnam 505503 St Kitts & Nevis 78.50%
Poland 454560 Seychelles 77.23%
United States 426103 Tonga 75.57%
Italy 395233 Samoa 73.38%
Cuba 331908 Nauru 71.99%
France 310754 St Lucia 68.61%
Iran 303385 Ant and Barb 68.49%
Hong Kong 292575 Gambia, The 67.78%
Jamaica 286932 Suriname 65.76%
Japan 278272 Belize 65.52%
Taiwan 274168 Tuvalu 64.90%
Russia 270445 Dominica 63.93%
Netherlands 254734 Fiji 62.75%
Ukraine 249015 Barbados 62.64%
Colombia 233073 Malta 58.31%
Ireland 228144 Mauritius 55.83%
Pakistan 220591 Kiribati 55.75%
New Zealand 174872 Sierra Leone 49.20%
Turkey 174689 Ghana 44.64%
South Africa 173021 Liberia 44.25%
Peru 163931 Lebanon 43.77%
Romania 162904 Marshall Islands 42.78%
Greece 161670 Kenya 38.52%
Source: Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009)
7Table 2: Diasporas toward the OECD receiving countries
United Kingdom Philippines India
USA 418794 USA 833958 USA 664406
AUS 381348 CAN 154960 CAN 153310
CAN 365420 AUS 51487 UK 123300
POL 85236 JAP 22208 AUS 55514
IRE 62946 UK 11463 NZE 7797
GER 40000 ITA 6566 GER 7075
FRA 33422 KOR 5213 FRA 3434
SPA 18060 GER 4922 SWI 2901
NET 13397 NZE 4311 JAP 2628
SWI 11346 IRE 2763 ITA 2158
ITA 7741 SPA 2420 SWE 2060
BEL 6741 NOR 1795 IRE 1854
JAP 5830 SWI 1715 NET 1825
NOR 5215 FRA 1533 NOR 1394
SWE 5020 SWE 1430 SPA 1140
TUR 2937 NET 1357 AUT 879
GRE 2525 AUT 898 BEL 844
POR 2291 GRE 616 KOR 606
DEN 2169 BEL 613 DEN 377
AUT 1854 DEN 421 MEX 252
NZE 1854 MEX 235 POR 165
MEX 1689 FIN 88 GRE 142
LUX 1268 POR 47 FIN 124
KOR 801 LUX 42 CZE 114
CZE 644 CZE 13 LUX 42
FIN 512 SLO 1 ISL 25
ISL 423 ISL 0 SLO 8
SLO 38 HUN 0 HUN 0
HUN 0 POL 0 POL 0
UK 0 TUR 0 TUR 0
Mexico Germany China
USA 919139 USA 387067 USA 434547
CAN 12165 CAN 111710 CAN 144765
SPA 6200 NET 97718 AUS 74114
GER 2372 UK 64573 JAP 60266
UK 2216 SWI 60935 UK 16270
FRA 2146 AUS 38440 GER 10233
SWI 986 FRA 32281 NZE 10020
ITA 941 TUR 30864 KOR 7064
AUS 687 AUT 24629 FRA 6885
JAP 517 SPA 22440 NET 4184
SWE 460 ITA 9299 SWE 2890
NET 372 SWE 8850 SWI 2189
BEL 239 BEL 7743 SPA 1900
AUT 223 POL 7045 ITA 1640
IRE 136 DEN 4672 AUT 929
NOR 116 NZE 4056 BEL 866
NZE 111 NOR 3749 IRE 833
POR 83 IRE 3254 NOR 812
DEN 78 MEX 3160 MEX 594
GRE 53 HUN 2833 DEN 555
FIN 31 LUX 2383 FIN 444
CZE 25 GRE 2259 TUR 415
LUX 21 POR 2167 CZE 316
ISL 18 JAP 1944 POL 280
HUN 0 CZE 978 LUX 123
KOR 0 FIN 740 POR 122
MEX 0 KOR 589 GRE 92
POL 0 SLO 95 SLO 16
SLO 0 ISL 48 ISL 6
TUR 0 GER 0 HUN 0
Source: Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009)
8are going to be used, such deﬁnition could appear either too inclusive or too
exclusive. For example, it would seem appropriate (or even too exclusive) if
one wants to measure the extent of a country’s ’skilled diaspora.’ Conversely,
it may seem too inclusive if one wants to estimate the ﬁscal cost of the brain
drain for the source country, in which case only people with home-country
higher education should be considered as skilled emigrants”.
Building on the Docquier and Marfouk dataset, Beine, Docquier and
Rapoport use immigrants’ age of entry for measuring where education has
been acquired. They provide alternative measures of the brain drain by deﬁn-
ing skilled immigrants as those who left their home country after age 12, 18
or 22, and they perform analyses for both 1990 and 2000. By construction,
their corrected rates are lower than the ones calculated with Docquier and
Marfouk’s dataset, which did not take into account the age of entry. However,
the country rankings by intensity of brain drain are almost the same.
Nevertheless, the determination of the origin of acquired education is
problematic with the Census-based data used by Docquier and Marfouk.
The ﬁrst problem is underlined by Rosenzweig (2005), who explains that
”information on ’entry’ year, which could be used to calculate entry age, is
based on answers to an ambiguous question - in the US Census the question
is ’When did you ﬁrst come to stay?’ Immigrants might answer this question
by providing the date when they received a permanent immigrant visa, not
the date when they ﬁrst came to the US, at which time they might not have
intended to or been able to stay”. Hence, age at ﬁrst entry might not signal
much regarding the location of a migrant’s schooling.
A second problem is linked to the fact that Census-based data provide in-
formation on the foreign-born population, but this ﬁgure includes unknown
proportions of persons who are not permanent immigrants, including stu-
dents. Therefore, this dataset completely ignores the fact that many tertiary-
educated people, residing in both low and high income countries, acquire
their tertiary schooling abroad mainly in high-income countries, which are
the major sources of education for students from low-income countries. In
addition, Census-based statistics can also overestimate the net loss of hu-
man capital, because they do not consider return migration among students
acquiring education abroad. This is a problem worth addressing if we want
to evaluate the actual magnitude of the brain drain, as the total number of
international students in the world is large; the UNESCO reported that in
2005 alone, over two million students were enrolled in tertiary institutions
as non-resident students. An evaluation of the eﬀects of students studying
9abroad on developing countries of origin requires information on the return
rates of foreign students. If no students return, then education abroad rep-
resents a net loss for the sending country. However, if all students return,
the sending country gains from emigration.
Rosenzweig (2006) has argued for the importance of knowing if higher
education has been acquired abroad; he has computed a rate of return to
evaluate the actual eﬀect of a brain drain on the sending country. In order to
do so, he constructed a ”stay rate” as the ratio of students deciding to stay in
the United States, that is, ”student stayers,” to the total number of foreign
students in the US. He used data on foreign students in the US taken from the
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which provides
information on current foreign-born students by country. He also used data
from the US new immigrant Survey (NIS) through which it is possible to
identify US student stayers, who are deﬁned as permanent immigrants who
ever held a student visa. In table 3, we compare the proportion of skilled
immigrants with US tertiary schooling with regard to both the Rosenzweig
and Docquier and Marfouk (DM) datasets, controlling for age of entry. 8
The correlation between these two measures is 0.26, and the measure from
DM dataset is higher for 83 countries and lower for 56 countries. Although,
as explained above, immigrants’ age of entry is not an adequate proxy for
measuring where education has been acquired, the Rosenzweig data also have
some limitations. This dataset is derived mainly from NIS data, which sam-
pled 4% of all US adult (18+) permanent resident aliens who received their
visas between April and November 2003. Even if the NIS is the only database
that identiﬁes a complete history of visits by each immigrant to the US, given
its number of observations, it presents the double disadvantage of not only
being incomplete due to the numeber of observations, but also presenting a
selective sample of countries, as only those countries with suﬃcient number
of immigrants in US are represented.
2.3 The sectoral characteristics of migrants: the im-
portance of the medical brain drain
The available evidence suggests that skilled migration is concentrated into
certain sectors. Two main sectors appear to attract a large proportion of
skilled migration, namely, the health and Information Computer and Tech-




10Table 3: Stay rate in Rosenzweig and Docquier-Marfouk data set
country us school DM06 country us school DM06 country us school DM06
Cyprus 1.000 0.540 Hungary 0.405 0.430 Egypt 0.076 0.248
Bahamas, The 1.000 0.540 Saudi Arabia 1.000 0.424 Nepal 0.192 0.243
Kuwait 0.163 0.540 Ireland 0.234 0.411 Sri Lanka 0.093 0.242
Belize 0.000 0.540 Malaysia 0.557 0.407 Romania 0.289 0.241
Cambodia 0.233 0.540 Croatia 0.649 0.396 Malta 1.000 0.240
Austria 0.363 0.540 Macedonia 0.000 0.390 Nigeria 0.285 0.236
Portugal 0.149 0.540 Bolivia 0.356 0.390 Senegal 0.000 0.231
Laos 0.000 0.540 Indonesia 0.736 0.386 Sierra Leone 0.430 0.227
Panama 0.484 0.540 Venezuela 0.264 0.382 United Arab Emirates 1.000 0.225
Greece 0.723 0.540 Sweden 0.429 0.382 Bangladesh 0.082 0.220
El Salvador 0.593 0.540 Thailand 0.783 0.381 Algeria 0.076 0.213
China, Hong Kong 0.527 0.540 Ethiopia 0.171 0.376 Ghana 0.366 0.213
Italy 0.655 0.540 Lithuania 0.161 0.370 Qatar 0.000 0.208
Vietnam 0.278 0.540 Denmark 0.382 0.369 India 0.143 0.205
Mexico 0.417 0.540 Chile 0.527 0.368 China 0.380 0.202
Tonga 0.000 0.540 Iraq 0.194 0.367 Sudan 0.144 0.179
Barbados 0.740 0.533 Yemen 0.271 0.365 Russia 0.162 0.177
Cuba 0.097 0.523 Singapore 0.592 0.364 Estonia 0.109 0.177
Guatemala 0.382 0.513 Colombia 0.196 0.361 Botswana 1.000 0.174
Jamaica 0.370 0.511 Argentina 0.148 0.361 Kazakhstan 0.127 0.143
Lebanon 0.227 0.508 Morocco 0.167 0.360 Turkmenistan 0.000 0.140
Costa Rica 1.000 0.498 Turkey 0.392 0.359 Ukraine 0.254 0.134
Belgium 0.450 0.498 Syria 0.464 0.345 Bulgaria 0.186 0.128
Trinidad & Tobago 0.397 0.495 United Kingdom 0.185 0.342 Albania 0.031 0.114
St. Vincent & Grenadines 1.000 0.495 Australia 0.254 0.341 Moldova 0.348 0.112
Jordan 0.086 0.493 Zimbabwe 0.571 0.341 Azerbaijan 0.472 0.109
Dominican Republic 0.000 0.493 Poland 0.123 0.325 Libya 0.000 0.108
Spain 0.222 0.489 Finland 0.947 0.325 Belarus 0.216 0.105
Latvia 0.636 0.488 Switzerland 0.202 0.322 Tunisia 0.000 0.103
France 0.358 0.485 Peru 0.124 0.322 Georgia 0.037 0.093
Canada 0.255 0.475 Eritrea 0.000 0.314 Uzbekistan 0.092 0.091
Grenada 0.634 0.471 Burkina Faso 0.000 0.311 Kyrgyzstan 0.000 0.090
Haiti 0.317 0.468 Tanzania 0.369 0.310 Tajikistan 0.000 0.062
Honduras 0.293 0.466 Kenya 0.349 0.300 Gambia, The 1.000 0.046
Fiji 0.000 0.463 Paraguay 1.000 0.299 Papua New Guinea 0.000 0.043
Guyana 0.152 0.461 Philippines 0.067 0.299 Mongolia 0.123 0.026
Korea 0.351 0.460 Liberia 0.353 0.280 Togo 0.041 0.022
St. Lucia 1.000 0.460 New Zealand 0.375 0.275 Cote d’Ivoire 0.335 0.018
Ecuador 0.260 0.459 Cameroon 0.091 0.274 Congo, Democratic Republic 0.000 0.017
Nicaragua 0.228 0.457 Pakistan 0.236 0.272 Rwanda 1.000 0.013
Norway 1.000 0.449 Armenia 0.062 0.272 Burma 0.285 0.010
Uruguay 0.000 0.448 Uganda 1.000 0.270 Chad 0.000 0.002
Netherlands 0.000 0.444 Taiwan 0.480 0.268 Zambia 0.117 0.002
Israel 0.290 0.440 Brazil 0.411 0.268 Niger 0.000 0.002
Iran 0.360 0.433 South Africa 0.262 0.266 Congo, Republic 0.000 0.001
Dominica 0.416 0.433 Somalia 0.636 0.260 Benin 0.000 0.000
Japan 0.525 0.430 Iceland 0.000 0.251
1
1nology (ICT) sectors. The emigration of health care workers is a persistent
form of brain drain. Commander et al. (2003) point out that in the 1960s
and 1970s, much of the concern about brain drains referred to the emigration
of doctors and nurses from developing countries. In comparison, the growth
of labor mobility in the ICT sector is a more recent phenomenon. The latter
phenomenon may be positive, since the ICT sector is usually characterized by
agglomeration and spillover eﬀects. Therefore, the development of associated
networking eﬀects may facilitate the adoption of new technologies in devel-
oping countries. However, a medical brain drain could be very detrimental
for developing countries, as it may aﬀect a country’s health conditions.
To estimate the extent of the medical brain drain, Docquier and Barghava
(2007) collected data on doctors with foreign qualiﬁcation working in the 16
main OECD countries. Aggregating these data, they computed medical em-
igration rates for all countries during the period 1991 to 2004 on an annual
basis. They deﬁned the medical brain drain as the proportion of physicians
trained, rather than born, in their country of origin and working abroad.
They show that small and low-income countries are the most aﬀected by the
medical brain drain. The health care shortages are particularly severe in
Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia. Among the 30 most aﬀected coun-
tries, 12 countries are from Sub-Saharan Africa (Cape Verde, Sao Tome and
Principe, Liberia, Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, Somalia, Ethiopia, Zim-
babwe, Malawi, Zambia, Sudan), where the number of health professionals is
very low. A signiﬁcant increase in emigration rates over time is also observed
in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Togo. These statistics yield a worrisome
picture, above all for African countries, where health conditions are generally
poor and more than 25 million people are stricken by HIV/AIDS.
The urgency of the problem is conﬁrmed by Barghava and Docquier
(2008), who ﬁnd that the medical brain drain has a negative impact on
the supply of healthcare staﬀ in developing countries, which may negatively
aﬀect health, life expectancy and the growth of the concerned population.
In particular, the fraction of a country’s physicians who work abroad has a
positive and signiﬁcant impact on the number of adult deaths due to AIDS.
Given the statistics on the medical brain drain, it is absolutely important
to develop policies aimed at increasing the supply of health care staﬀ in
developing countries. For this purpose, Barghava (2005) has suggested sub-
sidies from developed countries 9 and medical training for African students
9According to Barghava (2005), ”apart from voluntary restraints, developed countries
12in foreign countries. 10
In contrast, according to Clemens (2007), the medical brain drain does
not degrade basic public health conditions. Using a new bilateral dataset col-
lected by Clemens and Pettersson (2006), which provides estimates for the
emigration rates of physicians from 53 Sub-Saharan African countries migrat-
ing to nine countries (namely, UK, US, France, Australia, Canada, Portugal,
Belgium, Spain and South Africa), he found no causal connection between
the large African health worker diaspora and any degradation of indicators
of public health. 11 In his opinion, Africa’s generally low staﬃng levels and
poor public health conditions are the result of factors entirely unrelated to
international movements of health professionals. He instead puts the blame
on a ”bad” health system in which most of the highly trained health pro-
fessionals work outside the public sector, are regularly absent during their
working hours and do not spend any portion of their time working in rural
areas or slums, where children ”die principally from lack of oral rehydra-
tion during diarrhea, lack of malaria prophylaxis, and lack of basic primary
treatment for acute respiratory infections” (Clemens (2007)). While it is un-
deniable that the lack of any kind of modern preventive or primary health
care is a major problem for Africa, we argue that medical shortages triggered
by emigration of health professionals are a serious concern that needs to be
taken into account. Nobody can ignore the fact that countries such as Ghana
have only six doctors for each 100,000 people, whereas countries such as the
United States, Britain, Canada and Australia, have more than 220 doctors
recruiting staﬀ from African countries should be required to deposit the funds with an
agency such as the Global Fund that can compensate developing countries for emigrating
staﬀ and subsidize salary increases”
10According to Barghava, this should be encouraged even if other developing countries
are better-suited than developed ones so as to avoid permanent migration of medical staﬀ
after education has been acquired abroad
11Indicators included child mortality; mortality during the ﬁrst year of life per 1,000 live
births (IMR); the measles vaccination rate; the diptheria/pertussis/tetanus (DPT) vacci-
nation rate; the prevalence of acute respiratory infections (ARI) in children under age ﬁve
lasting at least two weeks and requiring medical care; the fraction of those ARIs that saw
a trained health professional; the percentage of deliveries attended by trained personnel;
the percentage of children under age ﬁve with diarrhea requiring medical attention and
lasting at least two weeks; the percentage of those diarrhea cases that received either oral
rehydration therapy or increased ﬂuids with continued feeding; the percentage of people
aged 15 - 49 who are infected with HIV; and the percentage of adults with advanced HIV
infection receiving antiretroviral treatment.
13per 100,000 people. 12
2.4 The quality of skilled migrants abroad
Many case studies (Kuznetsov, 2006, Kapur and McHale, 2005) highlight
that most members of diasporas were educated in the highest education in-
stitutions of their countries of origin. Considering, for example, the case of
Indian immigrants to the United States in the Information Technology (IT)
sector, most Indian engineers that expatriate to the US graduated from the
Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), a highly selective institution. To fur-
ther understand this phenomenon, we draw on Sukhatme’s (1994) analysis of
the IIT brain drain in Mumbai in the 1970s; according to this study, 31% of
IIT graduates settled abroad, while the estimated migration rate of engineers
for the country as a whole was only 7.3%. Furthermore, the migration was
signiﬁcantly higher in those branches of engineering in which IIT entrants
had the highest scholastic ranking. Other ﬁelds in India show a similarly
strong selection bias in emigration. In medicine, the emigration rate for doc-
tors in general was about 3% during the 1980s, but for graduates of the All
India Institute for Medical Sciences, India’s most prestigious medical train-
ing establishment, the rate was 56% between 1956 and 1980 and still 49%
in the 1990s. 13 The quality of education is an important factor in explain-
ing the performance of migrants abroad. Educational systems, in fact, are
qualitatively diﬀerent across countries, and this is especially true among de-
veloping and developed countries. Coulombe and Tremblay (2006) provide
data to measure the skill-schooling gap observed for the foreign population
with respect to the Canadian-born population in Canada. They view the
skill-schooling gap as an attempt at capturing the diﬀerence in the return
to schooling between Canada and other countries. The higher the schooling
gap, the lower the quality of the education system. This suggests also that
the value of schooling, in terms of acquired skills, varies considerably across
countries. 14 As presented in table 4, we can see that for poor countries, the
12Data from Devastating Exodus of Doctors From Africa and Caribbean Is Found, New
York times, 27/10/2005
13Khadria (1999).
14To calculate the schooling gap, Coulombe and Tremblay compute the mean skill level
at all schooling levels from the 2003 International Adult Literacy and Skills Survey (IALSS)
2003 data, and then they convert the mean skill level of international immigrants into the
equivalent years of schooling in the Canadian-born population. Finally, they compute
14gap is quite large. The diﬀerence in the schooling gap can translate itself into
diﬀerent earnings for migrants in the host country; this fact might provide
an explanation as to why only very select people from the most prestigious
schools can perform well abroad. Overall, this suggests that in several cases,
migration mainly concerns the best engineers, physicians, scientists or other
highly-skilled individuals.
Table 4: The skill-schooling gap of international immigrants by country of
origin and per capita income (Y)
Skill- Per capita Skill- Per capita
schooling income schooling income
gap gap
United States 0.9 28381 Vietnam 3.2 1498
Portugal 0.9 13134 Mexico 3.2 7159
Netherlands 1.3 20965 Other countr. 3.2
Italy 1.4 20147 China 3.3 2800
Russia 1.4 7192 Philippines 3.7 3021
United Kingdom 1.5 19543 Jamaica 4.2 3810
France 2.2 20142 El Salvador 4.2 4206
Germany 2.4 21048 Sri Lanka 4.3 3038
Hong Kong 2.4 25168 Poland 4.4 7338
Romania 2.5 4780 India 4.4 1978
Taiwan 2.8 14583 South Korea 4.9 13 767
Guyana 3.0 2651 Pakistan 5.0 1909
Iran 3.0 5302 Ukraine 6.5 4787
Lebanon 3.2 4495
Source: Coulombe and Tremblay (2006)
3 The Brain Drain and Human Capital For-
mation
This section explains and summarizes both the traditional view on the im-
plications of the brain drain for sending countries and the more recent view,
the diﬀerence between the mean years of schooling of the international immigrants and
the years of equivalent schooling in the Canadian-born population, and they adjust this
diﬀerence to take into account that the skill-schooling function is a concave function of
the diﬀerence between the mean years of schooling of the international immigrants and
the years of equivalent schooling in the Canadian-born population. The results provide a
single number in years of schooling, which is the skill-schooling gap.
15which emphasizes the role of skilled migration in the formation of human
capital
3.1 Controversy on Brain Drain and Human Capital
accumulation
An extended debate has been taking place on the economic impact of brain
drain on sending countries. Economic models in the 1960s, particularly
Grubel and Scott (1966), assumed perfectly competitive markets and no
public subsidy for education. With all markets clearing, wages set equal to
marginal product and without externalities, there was no welfare impact on
those remaining behind, thus the policy recommendation was free migration.
Later on during the 70’s, a series of new models emphasized the negative
eﬀects of skilled migration for the sending countries (for example, Bhagwati
and Hamada, 1974). They assumed a complementarity between skilled and
unskilled people, the departure of the skilled then reducing the productivity
of the unskilled. Therefore, in those models, skilled migration can be seen
as a negative externality on those left behind. In fact, as skilled workers
are generally the richest taxpayers, the sending country loses a substantial
source of income that can be taxed and redistributed. Moreover, sending
governments lose initial education investments, because they bear the cost of
human capital formation without receiving the returns, and so poor countries
become poorer and rich countries become richer. This early literature is also
well known for its policy conclusions. For example, Baghwati and Hamada
(1974) suggested an income tax on skilled migrants; this tax would be levied
by the receiving countries (i.e., the developed world) and redistributed in one
form or another to the sending (i.e., developing) countries.
New endogenous growth theories have renewed the relationship between
migration, education and growth. The ﬁrst models in this framework con-
tinued to emphasize the detrimental eﬀects of the brain drain on sending
countries. The main idea was that since human capital accumulation is im-
portant in inducing economic growth (Lucas, 1988), the loss in human cap-
ital induced by the emigration of skilled workers would reduce productivity
and income per capita, therefore restraining growth in the sending country
(Miyagiwa, 1991, Haque and Kim, 1995).
A more recent literature oﬀered a more optimistic perspective by demon-
strating the possibility of ”a brain drain with a brain gain” (Mountford 1997,
16Stark et al. 1997, 1998, Vidal 1998, Beine et al. 2001). The main insight of
these studies is that on an individual level, migration prospects increase the
expected return of education in poor countries and therefore foster domestic
enrolment in education. When this incentive (or ’brain’) eﬀect dominates the
observed emigration (or ’drain’) eﬀect, the origin country may in fact end up
with more human capital. One of the main assumptions of these models is
that the probability of migration is uncertain: among the many that invest
in education, only a fraction actually emigrates. Those who remain in the
country are endowed with higher human capital thanks to the incentive ef-
fect. Moreover it is necessary that skilled workers have a higher probability
to emigrate than unskilled workers.
What empirical evidence exists for this new theory? An important step
in the literature has been taken by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001).
They aim to estimating the growth eﬀect of the brain drain. In a cross-
sectional study of 37 developing countries, they show that the probability
of emigration has a positive impact on human capital formation in sending
countries, especially for countries with a low initial GDP per capita level.
In this study, they encountered data diﬃculties, since they had to use gross
migration rates as a proxy for the brain drain due to the lack of comparative
data on migration by educational attainment. In a subsequent study, Beine
et al. (2003) used the Carrington and Detriagiache dataset to estimate the
emigration rate for tertiary-educated people as a proxy for the brain drain.
This study covers more countries, including 50 developing countries, and
also uses more explanatory variables to understand the relationship between
human capital, migration and growth. The results conﬁrm their previous
study.
On the contrary, Faini (2003) ﬁnds little empirical support for this so-
called ”revisionist” approach. Using the Carrington and Detriagiache dataset,
he estimates a diﬀerent speciﬁed equation relating educational achievements
to a set of explanatory variables, including migration. He ﬁnds that a higher
probability of migration for workers with secondary education has no visible
impact on the rate of secondary school enrolment. Moreover, a higher prob-
ability of migration of workers with tertiary education has a positive and
signiﬁcant impact on the rate of secondary school enrolment, but a negative
one on tertiary school enrolment. According to Faini, one way to interpret
the results is that the most talented individuals try to migrate early, pursuing
their graduated studies abroad to have better chances in the host countries.
These results do not support Beine et al.’s (2003) beneﬁcial brain drain view.
17Mariani (2004) estimates diﬀerent growth equations in a cross-sectional
analysis of developing countries and considers both the Carrington and De-
triagiache and the Docquier and Marfouk datasets on skilled migration. He
ﬁnds that a brain drain can positively aﬀect income growth only if schooling
and/or income are not too unequally distributed across classes. Therefore,
only countries endowed with ”a numerous enough middle class” can beneﬁt
from the educational incentive derived from increased migration.
In a very recent study, Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008) use the
Docquier and Marfouk dataset and ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant impact
of skilled migration prospects on gross (pre-migration) human capital levels
in a cross-sectional analysis of 127 developing countries. The results also
hold using the Beine et al.’s (2007) alternative brain drain estimates when
controlling for where migrants acquired their skills. Positive eﬀects are also
obtained using alternative measures of a brain drain. They obtain uncertain
results when measuring human capital in terms of school enrolment rate,
conﬁrming Faini’s ﬁndings.
Beine, Defoort and Docquier (2006) estimate a similar equation in a panel
setting (speciﬁcally, six observations by country), controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity and the endogeneity of the migration rate. Their results con-
ﬁrm a signiﬁcant incentive eﬀect on developing countries; the eﬀect is stronger
in low-income countries.
Finally, Checchi et al. (2007) empirically investigate the relationship be-
tween factor mobility (that is, foreign direct investment (FDI) and migration)
and domestic human capital accumulation in developing countries. Consid-
ering both the incentive eﬀect of migration on investment in education and
the possibility that inward FDI can modify relative incentives to acquire ed-
ucation, possibly through the adjustment of relative returns to educational
attainment, they do not ﬁnd strong evidence for a beneﬁcial eﬀect of factor
mobility on domestic human capital accumulation.
Relying on their baseline speciﬁcation, Beine et al. (2008) use counter-
factual simulations and equate the skilled emigration rate to the unskilled
rate in order to estimate the net eﬀect of the brain drain for each country
and region. They ﬁnd that the brain drain stimulates human capital accu-
mulation among residents in some countries. It appears that the countries
experiencing a positive net eﬀect (the ”winners”) generally combine low lev-
els of human capital (below 5% ) and low skilled migration rates (below 20%
). Alternatively, countries that do not beneﬁt from a brain drain are typically
characterized by high rates of skilled emigration and/or high enrolment rates
18in higher education. The brain drain seems then absolutely positive for some
countries such as India and China, whereas for many Sub-Saharan African
or Central American countries it raises a lot of concerns.
Thus far, controversial empirical results concern the impact of a brain
drain on human capital formation. Given the quality of the data used in
the analysis (they are mostly cross-sectional studies, where the results often
depend on the speciﬁcation chosen), the results obtained must be considered
preliminary. Further analyses are required before drawing deﬁnitive conclu-
sions.
Beyond the aforementioned incentive eﬀect, return migration may also
promote human capital formation and social and cultural changes. Returnees
in fact can bring home new skills, new ideas and new technology. In the next
subsection, we will investigate these eﬀects.
3.2 Return Migration
The return of expatriates to their home country is widely perceived as ben-
eﬁcial, since migrants are expected to come back with more skills and in-
creased ﬁnancial resources. Hence, the fact that they will spend the rest of
their career in their origin country may have beneﬁcial eﬀects on that coun-
try’s productivity as well as the diﬀusion of technology, but we need further
empirical evidence to argue that skilled returnees positively aﬀect economic
development in their countries of origins.
Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2003) show that when an economy has a
relatively ineﬃcient research and development sector, the emigration of a
limited number of skilled workers may be beneﬁcial. Indeed, they can re-
turn with more knowledge and can contribute to the diﬀusion and imitation
of more advanced technologies. Return migration can then have a growth-
enhancing eﬀect that in turn reduces the technological gap between the two
economies. As a result, in the long run, fewer native-born workers are com-
pelled to emigrate, and more emigrants are likely to return. In a similar
paper, Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay (2004) show that a shift in immigration
policy, with an increase in the share of temporary visas, may beneﬁt coun-
tries from which educated migrants emigrate. Two eﬀects of the proposed
immigration policy are thus described: a decrease in the incentive to acquire
education, which reduces the pre-migration stock of human capital in the
origin country, and a higher proportion of returnees among emigrants, which
increases the country’s stock of knowledge, a complement of human capital.
19Their paper derives the theoretical conditions required for an overall positive
eﬀect to occur.
From a diﬀerent perspective, Stark et al. (1997) consider return migra-
tion in a context of imperfect information. Given the possibility to emigrate
and to receive higher expected returns to human capital, workers have an
incentive to invest in education in order to migrate. In the destination coun-
try, migrants are paid according to the average productivity of the migrants’
group. After a certain period of time, the personal abilities of migrants are
revealed, and thus workers will be paid according to their individual produc-
tivities. Relatively low-skilled workers will be paid less in the second period;
at this point, they may decide to return home to their origin country, which
may thus beneﬁt from their educational investments.
Returnees can also come back with ﬁnancial resources and overcome their
previous liquidity constraints by investing in their home country with sav-
ings accumulated abroad. For example, Ilahi’s (1999) study of Pakistan,
Mesnard’s (2001) and Mesnard and Ravaillon’s (2006) study of Tunisia, and
McCormick and Wahba’s (2001) study of Egypt show that savings repatri-
ated by migrants are used for investments into small businesses.
From still another perspective, Borjas and Brastberg (1996) demonstrate
that under fairly general conditions, return migration tends to exacerbate
the selection bias that characterized the initial immigrant ﬂow. That is,
if migrants were initially relatively skilled, then the returnees are the least
skilled of these emigrants. For example, Cohen and Haberfeld (2001) ﬁnd
that Israeli immigrants returning from the United States are negatively self-
selected from those Israelis who emigrated in the ﬁrst place.
Domestic residents who have decided to go and study abroad to acquire
additional human capital are a very important class of potential returnees.
But how many students eventually return? Solimano (2002) reports data
from the US National Science Foundation (NSF) that show that about 47%
of the foreign student on temporary visas who earned doctorates in 1990 and
1991 were working in the United States in 1995. Indeed, the majority of the
PhD students from India (79 % ) and China (88 % ) who graduated from
US universities in 1990 and 1991 were still working in the US in 1995. More
generally, this NSF study reports that foreign doctoral recipients in science
and engineering who were working in the US after 10 to 20 years tend to
remain in the US. Also, Barghava (2005) emphasizes the relation between
the medical brain drain and medical training in developed countries.
An opposing, more optimistic view is oﬀered by Rosenzweig (2006), who
20maintains that a large number of people born in low-income countries receive
their higher education in high-income countries, and the vast majority of
them return to their home country. Considering new data for the United
States taken mainly from the New Immigrant Survey (NIS), he calculates the
average student stay rate weighted by the number of students per country
of origin; he calculates this average at 4.7% this ﬁgure is 2.7% for Asian
countries of origin and 6.6% for students from countries outside of Asia. As
Roseinzweig states, ”these rates may seem low, but they are relative to the
stocks of students. If, say, there are ﬁve cohorts in the population of foreign
students, these rates would be multiplied by ﬁve to obtain probabilities that
a student in a single entry cohort of students did not return, which would be
about 20% (13.5% and 33% for Asian and non-Asian countries, respectively).
The ﬂow of students per year to the United States is about 250,000; the (NIS)
estimated count of about 50,000 student stayers from a cohort of immigrants
thus also suggests a stay rate of 20%˙ ” Even if this seems like good news,
these statistics must be considered with caution, as they are derived from a
4% sample of US permanent resident aliens 18 years or older who received
their visas between April and November 2003. Even if the NIS is the only
database with which it is possible to identify a complete history for each
immigrant of visits to the US, given its limited number of observations, the
dataset presents the double disadvantage of not only being incomplete but
also presenting a biased sample of countries, as only those countries with a
suﬃcient number of immigrants in US are represented.
In sum, we can say that in general, studies of return migration suggest
that those who return may be those that have performed relatively poorly
when abroad, while those who stay are the best and the brightest. Moreover,
as discussed in Faini (2003), if the most skilled migrants are the ones who
tend to remit less, then ”the home country residents will be further penalized
by the decline in remittances.”
Of course, these observations do not necessarily hold for all countries and
all migrants groups. But given these results, is it possible that the most
talented immigrants can still contribute to the economy of their country of
origin? Other sociological and economic studies show that some channels
related to the expatriates that do not require the return migration of highly
skilled individuals may be important, especially insofar as exports, invest-
ments, and scientiﬁc networks are linked to diasporas abroad. The most
talented migrants are likely to make their contribution as members of the
diaspora rather than through their return.
214 Diaspora Eﬀects
Even without return migration, networks and diasporas may promote trade,
investments and the circulation of information and technology in the sending
country. Networks and diasporas, moreover, may be important in facilitating
cultural and social changes. Obviously, diasporas encourage remittances that
are often invested in schools and training resources. In the following subsec-
tions, we investigate each channel through which diasporas from abroad can
enhance development in sending countries.
4.1 Brain Drain and Remittances
It has long been acknowledged that remittances can act as a counterbalance
to skilled migration. According to the Global Economic Prospects of the
World Bank (2006), recorded remittances in developing countries amounted
to about US dollar 167 billion in 2005, up 73 percent from 2001. Indeed, in a
lot of source countries emigrants’ remit earnings account for a sizeable share
of annual Gross Domestic Product and for some countries they represent
one of the major sources of foreign capital, even exceeding foreign direct
investments and development aid. The recent increase in remittances can be
explained through the growing importance of the underlying causes, namely
migration especially to rich countries, lower costs and larger networks in
the global ﬁnancial sector, and government policies that improve ﬁnancial
market access, which encourage the use of oﬃcial channels (Niimi, Ozden,
Schiﬀ, 2008).
Although remittances play a very important economic role in developing
countries, it is diﬃcult to know the speciﬁc remittance-patterns of skilled
migrants. Presumably, skilled migrants remit more, because they earn more.
However, skilled migrants probably come from wealthy families and therefore
have fewer incentives to remit.15 Moreover, skilled migrants tend to migrate
more on a permanent basis; as such, they are more likely to reunite with
their close family members. As Lucas and Stark (1985) show, the ﬂow of
remittances tends to decline the longer a migrant is abroad. Therefore, re-
mittances may tend to decline with skilled migration. Overall, it is therefore
not clear as to which force dominates to shape the pattern of remittances for
skilled migrants.
15One exception is that if they have a commitment to remit money back to their family
in order to refund their investments in education.
22At an aggregate level, Faini (2006) tries to investigate the relationship
between skilled migration and remittances by relying on the Docquier and
Marfouk dataset. He ﬁnds that a rise of 10% of the share of skilled migrants
is associated with a fall of 1 % in the GDP share of remittances. The results
of his study must, however, be considered with caution, because endogene-
ity problems between remittances and the education level of migrants are
not taken into account. In a further study, Niimi, Ozden and Schiﬀ (2008)
address this issue and again show that at a cross-country level, remittances
are negatively correlated with the educational level of migrants. This does
not necessarily imply that remittances from skilled migrants are negligible,
as shown by Kangasniemi et al. (2007). They ﬁnd that nearly half of Indian
medical doctors working in the UK remit income to their home country, and
these transfers represent on average 16% of remitter income. Certainly, fur-
ther analysis is required to examine the robustness of these results given the
limited availability of cross-country observations and the absence of data on
informal remittance ﬂows.
Another key issue refers to the motivation of remitters. Remittances
can be motivated by many factors, such as altruism or self-interest (Lucas
and Stark, (1985)). Some researchers believe that remittances are altruis-
tic motivated (migrants workers wish to support their family members left
behind) and they are countercyclical with domestic output (migrants send
more money when their home countries experience ﬁnancial crisis or natu-
ral disasters, e.g. Chami et al. (2003), Kapur and McHale (2005), Yang
and Choi (2007)). Others consider remittances as motivated by self-interest
plans (migrants workers could send money back home for the maintenance
of existing investments) and pro-cyclical with domestic output.
What are the economic consequences of remittances? It is often argued
by the literature that remittances are consumed instead of spent on produc-
tive activities that could stimulate economic growth in developing countries.
Moreover, those who receive and rely on remittances may have fewer incen-
tives to invest in their own income-generating activities. While many of these
problems may exist, recent studies show that remittances generally reduce
poverty and have positive eﬀects on the redistribution of income. For exam-
ple, Gustafsson and Makonnen (1993) show that if remittances to Lesotho
were completely removed, households classiﬁed as poor would increase by an
additional 11 to 14 %. In a more recent study, Adams (2006) ﬁnds that both
internal and international remittances reduce the level, depth, and severity of
poverty in Guatemala. Moreover, and contrary to other studies, he ﬁnds that
23most of remittances are not spent on consumption goods. Since households
perceived remittance earnings as temporary and uncertain, they preferred to
invest them in education, health and housing.
In a presentation of various studies conducted in 12 Latin American and
Caribbean countries, Acosta et al. (2007) ﬁnd that remittances widely re-
duce both extreme and moderate poverty, with poverty lines of 1 $ and 2 $
per day, respectively, when migration is assumed to have already taken place.
Eﬀects of poverty reduction are largest in countries such as Mexico and El
Salvador, where migrants come from the lower part of the income distribu-
tion. Extreme poverty falls by over 35% in both countries, and moderate
poverty falls by 15% for Mexico and 21% for El Salvador. The reduction in
extreme poverty and moderate poverty for the 12 countries is, on average,
14% and 8% respectively. Similar results regarding remittances and poverty
reduction in Mexico are also found in Taylor et al. (2005) and McKenzie
(2006).
Remittances also aﬀect human capital formation (Acosta et al. 2007).
Surveying Filipino households, Yang and Martinez (2006) ﬁnd that unantic-
ipated increases in remittances stimulate human capital accumulation and
entrepreneurship in origin households and contribute to lower levels of child
labor, greater levels of schooling for children, more hours worked in self-
employment and a higher rate of entry into capital-intensive enterprises.
Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003) and Hanson and Woodruﬀ (2003) also show
that migration and remittances reduce the participation of children in the
labor force. The impact is greater on girls than on boys. In the adult labor
market, Acosta (2007) shows that international migration and remittances
reduce female participation in the labor force. This suggests that interna-
tional migration and remittances induce women to work more inside the
home, thereby resulting in greater intra-household specialization.
In addition, remittances can stimulate investments in physical capital,
thereby alleviating credit constraints that deter investments in developing
countries (see Woodruﬀ and Zenteno (2001) for micro-enterprises in urban
Mexico, Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) for Turkey, Acosta (2007) for El
Salvador).
To summarize, the recent literature now recognizes a greater, positive role
of remittances in national economies in developing countries. Indeed, remit-
tances ﬁnance consumption as well as land and housing purchases, and they
are an important source of social insurance in lower-income countries. They
also provide liquidity for small enterprises, which is extremely important in
24the absence of well functioning credit markets, capital investments and ed-
ucation. Some countries have established policies to stimulate remittances.
For example, India and Pakistan provide higher interest rates to attract re-
mittances. Although they are very useful in alleviating immediate poverty,
their impact on long-term development still remains unclear. There is no ev-
idence that remittances can induce large economic transformation, the kind
that is essential to alleviate structural poverty in the long-term. Some coun-
tries, for instance, try to collect money through hometown associations to
support infrastructure development such as schools, health centers, but the
results are mixed. Ouaked (2002) underlines that ”these communities do
not necessarily have the resources to maintain what has been built through
the contributions of the expatriates. These communal remittances have not
yet been used signiﬁcantly for direct income generation projects, although
some governments are pledging to match funds earmarked for job creation
activities. (pg. 159) ”
4.2 Diasporas and ﬂows of goods and capital
In the last few years, a large sociological and, more recently, economic liter-
ature has acknowledged and studied migrant networks. In particular, these
networks are expected to facilitate the movement of goods and capital be-
tween migrants’ host and home countries. Both the growth in size of the
diasporas, especially the Chinese, Indian and Philippine diasporas in the
US, Canada, the UK and Australia, as well as their growing involvement
in the economies of their home countries have implications for the analysis
of the globalization process and the analysis of the impact of diasporas on
economic development in sending countries. The literature on international
trade provides remarkable insight on the role of diasporas. More recently, the
importance of the diaspora in facilitating investment and technology transfer
in the origin country has been highlighted. In the subsequent paragraphs,
we analyze this research. The importance of business and social networks in
facilitating trade has been the focus of many recent studies, from both the
theoretical (Greif, 1993; Rauch and Casella, 2003) and empirical perspectives
(Gould, 1994; Rauch and Trindade, 2002; Head and Ries, 1998). Among the
most important studies, Rauch and Trindade (2002) estimate a global bilat-
eral trade model for 63 countries in 1980 and 1990, investigating whether the
presence of large numbers of ethnic Chinese residents in the partner country
is associated with more trade. They computed the product of ethnic Chinese
25population shares for each trading partner and add this variable in a gravity
equation. Using this extended gravity model, they ﬁnd that country pairs
with higher concentrations of ethnic Chinese residents trade more with each
other. In his seminal paper on US trade with 47 trading partners during 1970
- 1986, Gould (1994) also ﬁnds that the stock of immigrants increases U.S.
trade. Both studies ﬁnally ﬁnd that immigrant networks induce less eﬀect
on trade in more homogeneous products, for which prices can eﬀectively con-
vey the relevant information, than on trade in more diﬀerentiated products,
for which matching the multifactor characteristics of buyers and sellers is
more important. Overall, these studies provide evidence that networks are
important in overcoming informal trade barriers.
Along these same lines, Head and Ries (1998) estimate an extended grav-
ity model of Canadian import and export patterns using panel data from 1980
to 1992 on bilateral trade with 136 trading partners. They ﬁnd that a 10 %
increase in the number of immigrants increases exports by 1 % and imports
by 3 %. Then they examine the immigration eﬀect on trade according to the
diﬀerent types and regions of the last permanent residence of immigrants.
The relationship between trade and ”skill-based migration” (independents)
proves to be signiﬁcantly greater than for family-based, refugee or business
immigrants.
In addition to the above-mentioned studies, many other studies from the
1990s and 2000s explore the impact of immigration on trade (see Wagner et
al., 2002, for a more detailed survey of the literature). In general we note
that many studies have been implemented in the context of the United States
and Canada (see Gould, 1994; Dunlevy and Hutchinson, 1999, 2001 for the
United States and Head and Ries, 1998 and Wagner et al., 2002 for Canada).
Additionally, there are studies on the UK (Girma and Yu, 2002), French
departments (Combes et al. 2003 ) and on the European Union (Parsons,
2005 ). Some of these studies refer to intra-national trade and migration
(Combes et al. across French Departments and Wagner et al. across Cana-
dian Provinces); others refer to cross-national borders. Each work focuses on
diﬀerent aspects; they may try to explain, for example, only diﬀerentiated
products (Gould 1994; Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999, 2001) as opposed to
all products. They may discuss immigration heterogeneity (Head and Ries,
1998) or business networks (Rauch and Trindade, 2002). All the studies ﬁnd
a signiﬁcant relationship between trade ﬂows and immigration, although the
magnitude of the migration eﬀect varies in across samples, groups of immi-
grants and products. The exports and imports elasticities range from 0.01 to
260.47. In some cases the exports elasticities are estimated to be higher that
the imports elasticities (Gould 1994, Combes et al. 2003), while in others,
the results are opposite (Heas and Ries 1998, Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999,
2001). To the extent that skilled migrants participate in business networks
that help reduce transaction costs between the host and home countries,
skilled migration will encourage future FDI ﬂows, which will foster activity
and welfare in the sending country.
Why would diasporas be important in promoting international trade and
investments? Rauch (2003) stresses two major channels through which dias-
poras could promote international trade and investments. First, a diaspora
creates (or substitutes for) trust in a weak international legal environment.
Co-ethnic networks provide community enforcement of sanctions to deter op-
portunism and violations of contracts. If a party acts opportunistically, then
its reputation suﬀers within that network. Second, the diaspora may pro-
vide market information as well as supplies matching and referral services.
Co-ethnic networks can promote trade, because they are familiar with the
market needs in their country of origin. They can provide to foreign investors
important information that may otherwise be diﬃcult or costly to obtain. In
addition, they reduce communication barriers; migrants know the language,
the culture, the values, the law and the practices of their home country.
They know their compatriots’ ways of thinking, and they better understand
who is trustworthy with regard to potential business partners. Note that the
phenomena described here seem to apply mainly to skilled migrants, as is
conﬁrmed by case studies of various sectors, including the software industry
(Saxenian, 1999, 2001, 2002, Arora and Gambardella, 2004).
A few empirical studies studies have attempted to measure the magnitude
of the diaspora externality in inducing investments, even if FDI can face even
larger transaction costs than international trade.
In his study on the role of ethnic Chinese networks in attracting FDI,
Gao (2003) considers both the population share of ethnic Chinese and the
log of the absolute population of ethnic Chinese in the source country. Using
a gravity model framework, Tong (2005) studies the role of ethnic Chinese
in promoting bilateral investments by using the product of the numbers of
ethnic Chinese in pairs of countries in 1990. In another study on Germany,
Buch, Kleiner and Toubal (2006) use state-level German data to investigate
whether and how migration and FDI are linked. They consider stocks of
immigrants living in Germany and German-inward FDI. They ﬁnd that there
is more inward FDI in German states that host a large foreign population
27from the same country of origin. This agglomeration eﬀect is conﬁned to
higher-income source countries. In fact, they ﬁnd that the impact of same-
country immigrants on FDI is positive, but not signiﬁcant; in contrast, the
interaction term between same-country immigrants and the source country
’s GDP per capita is generally signiﬁcant and positive. Since high-skilled
migration is most predominant in high-income countries, they interpret this
result to suggest an agglomeration eﬀect that is driven by complementarity
between inward FDI and high-skilled immigrants. However, they have not
been able to test this hypothesis directly, as they lack data on the skill
structure of immigrants.
Only recently, Kugler and Rapoport (2007) have combined the US Cen-
sus data on immigration stocks by country of origin and education level for
1990 and 2000 with data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis on FDI
outﬂows by destination country and sector. They model the relationships
of substitutability or complementarity between migration (by skill level) and
the sectoral composition of FDI. They ﬁnd that skilled migration and FDI in-
ﬂows are negatively correlated contemporaneously, but past skilled migration
is associated with an increase in current FDI inﬂows. Moreover, they ﬁnd
evidence of substitutability between current migration and FDI for migrants
with secondary education and of complementarity between past migration
and FDI for unskilled migrants.
Javorcik et al. (2006) also examined the relationship between the pres-
ence of migrants in the United States and US FDI in the migrants’ countries
of origin by explicitly taking into account the endogeneity problem that has
been ignored in previous studies. They ﬁnd that US foreign investments in a
sending country are positively correlated with the presence of that country’s
migrants within the US country. The data further indicate that the relation-
ship between FDI and migration is driven by the presence of migrants with
a college education.
Finally, Docquier and Lodigiani (2009) rely on original data at an ag-
gregate level and ﬁnd evidence of network externalities by using a dynamic
empirical model of FDI-funded capital accumulation. Their analysis conﬁrms
that business networks are mostly driven by skilled migration. In a cross-
sectional model focusing on 114 countries during 1990 - 2000, the elasticity
of the FDI-funded capital growth rate to skilled migration is around 2%.
They provide a panel extension with 83 countries and four periods, which
conﬁrms the existence of business network externalities. The elasticity of the
capital growth rate to the stock of skilled emigrants is between 2 and 3%.
28Hence, skilled migration may favor trade and FDI between the home and host
countries. Two main channels can be identiﬁed. First, the diaspora creates
or (substitutes for) trust in a weak international legal environment. Second,
the diaspora may provide market information, supplies matching and referral
services. Assuming that the ﬁrst channel is more important for investments
destined to countries with weak institutions, Tong (2005) has tried to iden-
tify which is the most important mechanism in promoting FDI. She divided
the bilateral FDI into two groups based on the level of bureaucratic quality
in host countries. She ﬁnds that even if the community enforcement of sanc-
tions is important for FDI into countries with weak institutions, the most
important role of ethnic Chinese networks is providing crucial information to
investors. This fact is particularly interesting if we think about the possible
relationship between network eﬀects, FDI and growth.
According to Rauch (2003), the ”information” channel seems to be very
important, since its impact is less likely to decrease over time. Moreover,
if the diaspora promotes trade and investments in such a way, migrants
are more likely to promote the types of international trade and FDI that
stimulate economic growth. Of course, the connection between trade, FDI
and growth does not simply result from increments in foreign exchange, but
rather it is signiﬁcantly related to knowledge generation, imitation and dif-
fusion processes.
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0.12 0.14
Notes: *Trade elasticities with respect to immigration. **Estimation without ﬁxed eﬀects. *** Estimation with diﬀerentiated products.
Source: Parsons (2005)
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314.3 Diasporas and ﬂows of ideas
The importance of the skilled migrant diaspora in creating technology and
knowledge transfer is related not only to the presence of trade and FDI.
Indeed, a recent body of literature has suggested that more or less informal
networks can be important in conveying knowledge and technology from the
developed to the less developed world (Meyer and Brown 1999, Meyer 2001).
To better explain expatriate knowledge networks, Meyer and Brown (1999)
identify various types of possible networks: student/scholarly networks; local
associations of skilled expatriates; expert pool assistance through the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s Transfer of Knowledge Through
Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program; and intellectual/scientiﬁc dias-
pora networks. Among the latter, a distinction is made between those net-
works that do not yet have stable or precise features and those that are
more established and organized. Overall, ﬁve possible network categories are
identiﬁed.
The ﬁrst category encourages the sharing of information among scholars.
Student/scholarly networks often facilitate studies abroad and/or reintegra-
tion into the highly-qualiﬁed labor market afterward. This kind of network
may be very important in facilitating knowledge transfer among countries.
As Lowell and Gerova (2004) argue, there is a strong positive correlation
between the number of foreign scholars with a US PhD and the extent to
which scientiﬁc articles authored in sending countries include a US author.
That means that if scholarly networks helps link highly-skilled migrants to
their home country, diaspora networks can stimulate collaboration and the
exchange of knowledge.
The second type of networks, local associations of skilled expatriates, are
groups of highly-skilled professionals who meet regularly both professionally
and socially. Among these associations, for example, the SIPA (Silicon Valley
Indian Professionals Association) has played an important role in the devel-
opment of cooperation and exchange among highly-skilled expatriate Indians
as well as between the US and India in high-technology areas.
The third type, the TOKTEN programme of the UNDP, aims at encour-
aging the expertise of highly-skilled expatriates to undertake short-term con-
sultancies in their countries of origin for short periods of time. TOKTEN has
proven to be a practical and eﬀective scheme for transferring advanced knowl-
edge and skills in cost-eﬀective ways in countries such as Lebanon, Palestine,
and Pakistan. Host institutions beneﬁt from the expertise brought by TOK-
32TEN volunteers at low or no cost to the origin countries, often resulting
in speedy implementation. Meanwhile, consultants derive satisfaction from
knowing they have played a part in the development of their countries. Fi-
nally and more generally, there are intellectual/scientiﬁc diaspora networks,
both developed with precise features and developing classiﬁed as such, be-
cause they share certain characteristics with intellectual/scientiﬁc diaspora
networks, but not yet well established and organized.
To understand the possible impact of knowledge networks, Lowell and
Gerova (2004) update Meyer and Brown’s (1999) list and ﬁnd 20 organiza-
tions in addition to the 41 web-based diaspora networks described by Meyer
and Brown. Lowell and Gerova (2004) argue that making a clear distinction
among these categories is quite diﬃcult; nevertheless, ”whatever their scope
and proﬁle, the sheer number and diversity of diaspora groups seemingly at-
tests to their increasing importance as nodes of activity connected to their
homeland.” (pag. 24)
If the literature provides much anecdotal evidence on knowledge diﬀusion
and brain circulation, very few studies directly address this question either
theoretically or empirically.
In fact, only very recently, Kerr (2005) uses data on international patent
circulation and ﬁnds that a large ethnic research community in the US pro-
motes technology diﬀusion to less advanced countries of the same ethnicity.
Along the same lines, Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale (2008) use patent cita-
tion data for Indian inventors to show that both spatial and social proximity
increase the probability of knowledge ﬂows between individuals, even if the
co-location eﬀect is larger on average than the diaspora eﬀect. Kuhn and
McAusland (2006), alternatively, develop a theoretical model for beneﬁcial
brain drain based on a positive externality due to the relatively greater level
of knowledge creation of skilled workers who move to an environment in
which higher-quality knowledge goods are produced. Migrants, in fact, may
produce products of greater value to their origin-country consumers than
the products they would have produced at home. The beneﬁcial brain drain
is even more likely to be observed in the context of weak sending country
intellectual property rights.
Finally, Lodigiani (2008) shows that the skilled diaspora stimulates pro-
ductivity growth through technology diﬀusion and adoption if the sending
country is far from the technological frontier. The basic idea is that the
skilled diaspora facilitates adoption of foreign technologies in the home coun-
try, thereby contributing to its economic growth. Given that adoption is more
33productive in countries that are far from the technological frontier, a brain
drain has more positive eﬀect on these lagging economies.
4.4 Other Diaspora Eﬀects
The hypothesis that migration may generate positive externalities on the
sending country is not only true for technology adoption but for other areas
as well. For example, migrants to relatively democratic societies may have a
positive impact on social, economic, and political institutions in their home
countries. As such, they might transmit new ideas and behaviors prevailing
in the destination countries. In particular, they may aﬀect views on family
structure and, consequently, the fertility rate in their origin countries.
As far as these eﬀects are concerned, few studies have examined the im-
pact of skilled migration on governance, corruption, rent-seeking and ethnic
discrimination. Using a political economy model of ethnic discrimination,
Docquier and Rapoport (2003) assume a rent-extraction basis for discrimina-
tion; they model discrimination as a ﬁnancial penalty levied on each educated
minority member and equally redistributed among the majority. Therefore,
two sources of ethnic inequality emerge in the model. Discrimination de-
creases the return on human capital for the minority group; this, in turn,
reduces the number of minority members who invest in education. Focusing
on the impact of migration prospects on the optimal tax rate from the major-
ity’s perspective, they ﬁnd that under free international mobility, migration
prospects promote investments in education among the minority members
and ethnic inequality decreases. Moreover, the equilibrium discrimination
rate is such that the minority member with the highest ability is indiﬀerent
as to whether emigrate or not. Therefore, no migration ﬂows are observed
at equilibrium. On the contrary, under high immigration restrictions, ethnic
discrimination increases and migration ﬂows are observed.
Extending the corruption model of Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991),
Mariani (2006) ﬁnds that brain drain can reduce corruption in the origin
country and induce more students to opt for productive ﬁelds of study. In
his model, individuals have two career possibilities: they can either engage
in rent-seeking or in productive activities. If individuals opt for the second
option, they may have the possibility of emigrating to a rent-free foreign
country. Hence, the probability of migration reduces the relative return of
rent-seeking, and decreases the fraction of skilled workers who engage in un-
productive careers. Mariani provides some stylized facts that conﬁrm his
34ﬁndings. Across countries, the skilled migration rate is positively correlated
with the fraction of educated people who specialize in productive studies, as
measured by the proportion of students in science and engineering. Alterna-
tively, the skilled emigration rate is negatively correlated with the fraction
of students who specialize in parasitic activities, as measured by the propor-
tion of students enrolled in law, theology and religion studies. Evidently, the
casual relationship between migration and corruption must be tested, but
regardless, this paper oﬀers a new channel through which skilled migration
can be beneﬁcial for the home country.
Li and McHale (2006) take a further step in the same direction; they
investigate the impact of brain drain on the sending country’s institutional
development. To implement their study, they ﬁrst consider a general theoret-
ical framework based on Albert Hirschman ’s ”exit and voice” model (1970),
which helps them to clarify the main channels through which skilled migra-
tion may impact institutional development. On the one hand, for instance,
skilled migrants may serve as a powerful lobbying voice from abroad. On the
other hand, migration can have a negative impact on institutional develop-
ment if migrants exit and remain silent abroad, in this way their exit can
simply mean the absence of the positive impact of domestic human capital on
institutions. Estimating the model in a cross-section environment and con-
trolling for domestic human capital, GDP per capita and some other political
and cultural factors, they ﬁnd that: 1) domestic human capital has a posi-
tive eﬀect on home country’s political and economic institutions; 2) skilled
migration has a positive impact on home country’s political institutions but
a negative impact on economic institutions; and 3) the net institutional ef-
fect of moving a portion of skilled people abroad has no signiﬁcant impact
on home country’s political institutions, but it does have an overall negative
eﬀect on economics institutions.
Alternatively, Spilimbergo (2009) uses a panel dataset on foreign students
starting from 1950 to show that foreign-educated individuals promote democ-
racy in their home country, if the foreign education is acquired in democratic
countries. This issue is worth of much further investigation.
Migrants may not only have a positive impact on economic and political
institutions in their home countries, but they may inﬂuence other areas as
well by transmitting new values and ideas. In this regard, Fargues (2007)
investigates the relationship between migration and the birth rate in the ori-
gin country. According to him, migrants are likely to assimilate ideas and
behaviors prevailing in the destination countries and transmit them to their
35countries of origin. Therefore if people emigrate to a low birth-rate country,
they may contribute to the reduction of birth rates in their source countries
by aﬀecting views on family structure in their origin countries. On the other
hand, the hypothesis suggests that migration to high birth-rate countries in-
duces an increase in the birth rate. Fargues presents empirical evidence in
favor of his hypotheses for three source countries: Morocco, Turkey (from
which most people migrate to Western Europe) and Egypt (from which most
people migrate to the oil-rich Persian Gulf countries). In support of his idea,
he ﬁnds a strong negative relationship between migration and birth rates
among residents for Morocco and Turkey and of a positive relationship for
Egypt. More recently, Beine, Docquier and Schiﬀ (2009) use a conceptual
framework similar to Spilimbergo (2009), examine the relationship between
international migration and source country fertility. Using original and de-
tailed data on migration, they provide evidence that South-North migration
can lead to a reduction in fertility rates in the South, thus contributing to a
reduction in home country population pressure.
5 The Need for a New Research Agenda
In this paper, we have presented an overview of the main issues concerning
the so-called brain drain phenomenon. In the past, the brain drain was seen
as one of the biggest problems for developing countries. In recent years,
scholars have highlighted how it can induce some incentives and thus certain
positive feedback eﬀects for the source country. In particular, the diaspora
seems to play an increasingly important role in the globalized world.
Diasporas may act as ”bridges” between the destination and the source
countries, and they can stimulate trade, investments and the transfer of tech-
nology. The hypothesis that migration may generate positive externalities on
the source country may be true not only with regard to trade, investments
and technology diﬀusion but also for other areas as well. In particular, mi-
grants to more democratic societies may have a positive impact on the social,
economic, and political institutions in their home countries. Moreover, they
might transmit new ideas and behaviors prevailing in the destination coun-
tries, and as such, they may inﬂuence, for example, views on family structure
in their origin countries and, consequently, the fertility rate in those coun-
tries. Although much work has investigated whether expatriate networks
can induce trade, other issues remain almost entirely unexplored. Neverthe-
36less, the literature does show that the diaspora may be important for the
development of migrants’ origin countries.
As far as technological transfer is concerned, India and China are exam-
ples of successful diasporas. On one hand, the very important role of the
Indian Diaspora in the Indian IT sector has been widely discussed (Saxenien
1999). The sizable growth of the software sector, in fact, was possible thanks
both to policies governing higher education in India and to the Indian execu-
tives living in the US who instilled in US-based companies the conﬁdence to
outsource in India. The Indian diaspora was also important helping Indian
ﬁrms to meet US quality and delivery requirements. On the other hand,
the large size and the high-skill composition of the Chinese diaspora abroad
has played a critical role in the knowledge exchange process thanks to the
activities of the formal and informal overseas Chinese professional (OCP) as-
sociations and to the proactive role of the Chinese government in exploiting
the beneﬁts of the Chinese diaspora.
Based on this literature overview, we wonder, what are the general con-
ditions for a successful diaspora. Answering this question is a quite diﬃcult
task, because every case has its own features. However, it seems that there
are some ”potential” factors that are preconditions of a successful diaspora.
First of all, the home country size seems to be an important factor. Large
countries have larger diasporas and, therefore, larger networks. Intuitively,
the beneﬁt of networks increases with network size, and therefore, large coun-
tries are more likely to beneﬁt from their diaspora. But network size is just
one factor. Other conditions that contribute to the success of the diaspora
include the concentration of the diaspora in the destination country 16, its
educational level, skill set and income, political selection biases at origin 17,
the activities in which the diaspora is engaged 18, and the developing gap
between the host and destination countries. This gap may emerge in the
technology sector, but it can also be seen with respect to ideas or values such
as democracy, equal opportunity for men and women, and other modern
democratic ideas.
16The more the diaspora is concentrated, the more likely is the formation of a ”critical
mass” of migrants
17The best and the brightest are more likely to emigrate and attain tertiary education
abroad
18Distinctions may include skilled versus non-skilled labor; tradable sector versus non-
tradable; new industries versus mature industries can be important factors for technology
transfer for example (Kapur 2001)
37Broadly speaking, home countries have much to gain from their diaspo-
ras, but assessing the beneﬁcial eﬀects of skilled migration is complex task.
In some cases, ﬂows are veriﬁable beneﬁcial. India and China are examples of
beneﬁcial diasporas; however, note that not only do these countries provide
the greatest number of skilled migration, but they furthermore are so big that
the depletion of human capital in the origin country is very low. Moreover,
we must also consider that the positive impact is related to speciﬁc sectors
of the economy in which migrants engage. Countries need human capital to
innovate and imitate, implement programs and create new institutions. Very
poor countries with a very high emigration rate cannot beneﬁt from skilled
migration. For example, the medical brain drain has been detrimental for
Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, a certain level of development is a prereq-
uisite for a country to reap the beneﬁcial eﬀects of migration. Diasporas
in fact can facilitate development but cannot by themselves fundamentally
change the prospects of a country. Nevertheless, under certain conditions, we
believe that scientiﬁc and business networks are very important for economic
and institutional long-term development, much more so than remittances re-
gardless of how greatly they contribute to poverty alleviation and inequality
reduction.
However, it is very diﬃcult to parse out the dominant and minor mech-
anisms at work and to assess the global impact of the brain drain on de-
veloping countries. Thanks to new, integrated datasets on migration stocks
and migration rates by educational attainment, many elasticities have been
estimated in the recent literature in order to better analyze several direct and
feedback eﬀects caused by skilled migration. However, much work remains
in order to understand the importance of these mechanisms.
Given the complexity of a phenomenon such as migration in general
and skilled migration in particular, a multi-level methodological approach
is needed in order to fully account for its complexity. In particular, to un-
derstand the diﬀerent contextual dynamics that characterize the impact of
skilled migration on origin country development, a match between detailed
and aggregate countries level analysis is needed. Aggregate studies that al-
low for cross-country comparisons, in fact, are very important in providing an
overall picture, but they give limited insight into the causes and consequences
of migration in individual countries. Thus, more micro studies are needed
to ﬁll this gap and go beyond the current ﬁndings in the literature. Fur-
thermore, qualitative and quantitative approaches should complement each
other; descriptive case studies are necessary to clarify the many theoretical
38mechanisms that are diﬃcult to clarify many theoretical mechanisms that
are diﬃcult to be introduced in a more analytical and detailed contest.
In order to draw more general conclusions about skilled migration, broad
and heterogeneous research methods are needed. Only this way will it be
possible to evaluate the impact of skilled migration in diﬀerent domestic
contexts; as such, policies can be better crafted to minimize the negative
impacts of a brain drain and maximize its positive eﬀects.
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